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PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE
Abstract
A number of recent studies have documented extensive downward rigidity of
nominal wages for job stayers in many oecd countries. Individual downward rigidity
might induce a positive nominal growth in aggregate wages, to ensure changes in
relative wages. A ratchet eﬀect, where workers with ﬁxed wages and secure jobs
use threats of reduced eﬀort to enforce a wage hike, would also lead to growth in
aggregate wages. However, downward ﬂexibility might be ensured by old, high-wage
workers being replaced by young, low-wage workers, or by ﬁrms cutting ﬂexible parts
of compensation. We explore industry data for 19 oecd countries, over the period
1973–99. We ﬁnd evidence of a ﬂoor on nominal wage growth of 4–6 percent in the
1970s, 2 percent in the 1980s, and at zero in the 1990s.
jel: J3, J5, C14, C15, E31
Keywords: Wage inﬂation, downward nominal wage rigidity, oecd, wage settingA number of recent studies have documented extensive downward nominal wage rigidity
(dnwr) for job stayers in many oecd countries. Based on micro data from 16 oecd
countries, Dickens et al. (2007a) ﬁnd that dnwr prevents wage cuts from taking place in
all countries, with the fraction of wage cuts prevented ranging from 4 percent in Germany
to 58 percent Portugal. Dessy (2002), Knoppik and Beissinger (2005) and Lebow et al.
(2003) ﬁnd comparable evidence, and Akerlof et al. (1996) and Bewley (1999) report
strong evidence of dnwr based on interviews and surveys of employees and employers.
Furthermore, Holden and Wulfsberg (2008) ﬁnd evidence of dnwr in industry level data
for many oecd countries.
In this paper we explore empirically whether dnwr at zero nominal wage growth for
individual workers is transformed to a “ﬂoor” for the industry level wage growth that is
diﬀerent from zero. By this we mean that dnwr aﬀects industry level wage growth at
possibly other rates than zero. For policy reasons it is important to know whether such
ﬂoors exist, and if so, where they are.
How can dnwr at zero for individual workers lead to a positive wage growth at more
aggregate levels? One mechanism, emphasised by macro and labour economists in the
1960s and 1970s (see e.g. Tobin, 1972), was that if dnwr prevented wage reductions
in labour markets with excess supply, changes in relative wages could only take place
by wage rises, even if there is no excess demand in the aggregate. While this argument
was rejected by many economists as based on “money illusion”, the recent evidence of
extensive dnwr makes the story again potentially relevant. A second possible mechanism
is that downward rigidity might involve a ratchet eﬀect, where workers with ﬁxed wages
and secure jobs use threats of reduced work eﬀort to enforce a rise in nominal wages, see
Moene (1988), Cramton and Tracy 1992 and Holden (1989).
On the other hand, there are also mechanisms which may ensure that there is some
downward ﬂexibility in the aggregate, even if wages of individual workers are subject to
dnwr. One such mechanism is that, over time, old high wage workers are being replaced
by younger workers with lower wages, involving a reduction in ﬁrms’ wage costs. Another
mechanism is that if downward wage rigidity prevails in one ﬁrm, jobs might be shifted
over to other ﬁrms with lower wages. Even within ﬁrms, if the ﬁrm is unable or unwilling
to cut nominal wages for some individuals, it may have other means at its disposal, which
2may induce some downward ﬂexibility. For example, ﬁrms may respond to downward
wage rigidity for some workers by cutting ﬂexible parts of the remuneration, or by the
cutting wages of other workers. As there are mechanisms in both directions, the overall
eﬀect of dnwr on aggregate wage growth is ultimately an empirical question.
The issue of whether dnwr might lead to a ﬂoor on wage growth is of great impor 
tance for economic policy. As argued by Tobin (1972), Akerlof et al. (1996, 2000) and
Holden (1994), if inﬂation is pushed so low that dnwr binds, the result will be excess
wage pressure and persistent higher unemployment. Thus, one would want the inﬂation
target to be suﬃciently high that the risk of widespread binding dnwr being small. If
there is a ﬂoor for wage growth above zero, a target of, say, two percent inﬂation may
involve the risk of pervasive binding dnwr, unless productivity growth is so high that it
provides suﬃcient scope for wage growth above the price growth. If a ﬂoor is below zero,
an inﬂation target of two percent might be ﬁne, without any large risk of binding dnwr.
Recently, economists have provided arguments for price level targeting (Canada), which
implies that a period of higher inﬂation than consistent with the price level target, must
be oﬀset by a period of very low inﬂation. In the case of Portugal and Italy, high nominal
wage growth relative to the productivity growth with a steady loss of competitiveness,
seems to be amplify the diﬃcult economic situation these countries are in (Blanchard,
2007). Thus, it seems important to address the possible existence and level of a ﬂoor on
nominal wage growth empirically.
In order to investigate the existence and eﬀects of wage ﬂoors in the aggregate econ 
omy, we explore industry data for 19 oecd countries, over the period 1973–2006. More
than 13,000 observations from 604 country year samples, i.e. an average of [21] indus 
tries per sample. To explore whether there is a ﬂoor on wage growth, we extend the
method we have used in our previous work on dnwr (Holden and Wulfsberg, 2008).
Roughly, the test for the existence of a ﬂoor on wage growth goes as follows. In line with
previous studies, we construct the notional wage change distribution (i.e., the assumed
distribution under ﬂexible wages) on the basis of observations from country years when
the wage growth is high, and thus dnwr is not likely to bind. By comparing empirical
and notional country year speciﬁc wage change distributions for diﬀerent ﬂoors, we can
construct country year speciﬁc estimates of the extent of dnwr, given by the deﬁcit of
3wage cuts in the empirical samples.
Previous empirical literature on nominal wage rigidity has given little attention to the
question of a nominal wage ﬂoor diﬀerent from zero. Nickell and Quintini (2003), studying
dnwr for individual employees in the uk, report evidence indicating that downward
rigidity leads to strictly positive wage growth for some workers. Holden (1998), analysing
wage setting at central level for the manufacturing sectors in the Nordic countries, ﬁnd
evidence of a ﬂoor on nominal wage growth given at 2–3 percent, and Holden (1989) ﬁnd
consistent evidence for local wage setting at Norwegian industry data.
To preview our results, we ﬁnd evidence of a ﬂoor on aggregate wage growth at 4–5
percent in 1970s. According to our point estimates, half of the notional industry wage
changes in the 1970s below 4 percent, were pushed up above 4 percent, while 15 percent
of all notional changes below 6 percent were pushed above this level. In the 1980s, the
ﬂoor was weaker and lower; 20 percent of all wage changes below 2 percent were pushed
up above 2 percent. In the 1990s, the ﬂoor fell down to zero, with a fraction of notional
wage cuts prevented by dnwr of about 20 percent. In the 2000s, we ﬁnd evidence of
a ﬂoor only in the Nordic countries at 0–1 percent wage growth. The ﬂoor on nominal
wage growth in the 1970s and 1980s, even if considerably below average inﬂation (in our
sample an unweighted average of all countries of 10 percent in the 1970s and 8 percent
in the 1980s), may have contributed to causing persistent inﬂation. Furthermore, the
existence on ﬂoors on nominal wage growth may also contribute to the explanation of
the large rise in unemployment that accompanied the disinﬂationary policies in the 1980s
.
1 dnwr and ﬂoors for aggregate wage growth
Economic literature has discussed a number of theories for why wages might be rigid
in real terms. However, rigidity in nominal terms requires a nominal element, which
standard bargaining theories, eﬃciency wage theories or insider outsider theories do not
have. Keynes (1936) argued that dnwr was a consequence of coordination failure; work 
ers are concerned about relative wages, and they resent a nominal wage cut because this
also involves a reduction in relative wages, while a similar reduction in real wages caused
4by higher prices would not aﬀect relative wages. A second theory of downward nominal
wage rigidity is based on the fairness argument, that agents ﬁnd a nominal wage cut
unfair, and that employers will avoid wage cuts because it may have an adverse eﬀect
on morale, and thus hurt productivity. While economists typically have been skeptical
towards this argument, as it involves a sort of money illusion, there is now consider 
able survey evidence by Blinder and Choi (1990), Akerlof et al. (1996), Bewley (1999),
Franz and Pfeiﬀer (2006) and Agell and Lundborg (2003) documenting that such views
are prevalent. A third theory of downward nominal wage rigidity is based on the legal
feature in most countries that nominal wages are given in contracts that can only be
changed by mutual consent, where the legal eﬀect may prevail even after the expiration
of time dependent contracts, see MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and Holden (1994); see
supporting survey evidence of Franz and Pfeiﬀer (2006) and Agell and Lundborg (2003).
Several mechanisms could lead to ﬂoors on nominal wage growth that is diﬀerent from
zero. Note that all these mechanisms are based on real term eﬀects, but it leads to changes
in nominal wages because of the setting with downward rigidity of nominal wages. A key
reason for nominal wage growth, often alluded to in discussions of policy implications of
dnwr (see e.g. by Tobin (1972) and the formal exposition in Akerlof et al. (1996, 2000)),
is that the need for changes in relative wages requires growth in average wages if there is
downward rigidity of nominal wages. A second mechanism, analysed by Moene (1988),
Cramton and Tracy (1992) and Holden (1989, 1997), is based on the assumption that
employment contracts are incomplete. As argued by Moene (1988), employees under a
ﬁxed wage contracts may impose a cost on the ﬁrm without violating the employment
contract, e.g. by meticulously adhering to the exact words in the employment contract.
Such behaviour is well known as “work to rule” in real world wage negotiations in many
industrialised economies. While ﬁrms in some cases may reduce ﬂexible elements of the
remuneration (e.g. bonus schemes), we show in the appendix that the outcome of the
wage setting will be a nominal wage increase if workers can impose a larger cost on the
ﬁrm during a work to rule than vice versa.
Growth in nominal wages might also be a consequence of ﬁrms’ attempt to induce
higher eﬀort from the employees. In many countries, a large part of the employees are
hired under ﬁxed nominal wage contracts, with fairly stringent employment protection.
5In such situations, it might be diﬃcult for the ﬁrm to ensure that employees provide
suﬃcient eﬀort. One way of ensuring high eﬀort might be to give nominal wage increases
to workers who supply high eﬀort.1 This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Smith (2002),
who document that individuals in the British Household Panel Study whose nominal
wage is cut are less happy than individuals who obtained a wage increase, while there is
no diﬀerence between those with wage cuts and those with wage freezes.
On the other hand, it is also possible that ﬁrms have considerable downward nominal
ﬂexibility, even if nominal wages of individual workers are rigid downwards. First, even
if the ﬁrm is unable to reduce base wages, it might be possible to reduce bonus schemes,
fringe beneﬁts, holiday pay, sick pay, etc. Second, if wages for some workers are rigid
downwards, ﬁrms might compensate by giving lower wages to other workers. Third,
wage rigidity in some ﬁrms might imply that jobs move to other ﬁrms where wages
are ﬂexible, cf the model below. Finally, turnover might also give rise to considerable
downward ﬂexibility. Over time, old, high wage workers retire, and they are replaced by
younger workers usually with lower pay. This may lead to a reduction in average wages,
even if no individual worker takes a wage cut. In situations where redundancies are
requires, ﬁrms may have some discretion in choosing whom to lay oﬀ, and they may then
choose to lay oﬀ workers with high wages. (Clearly, there are large diﬀerences between
countries as to whether the ﬁrm has the legal possibility to do this.) These mechanisms
may all imply that individual dnwr is consistent with to a ﬂoor on aggregate nominal
wage growth that is below zero.
Overall, whether a ﬂoor on nominal wage growth in aggregate data is positive or
negative is likely to vary between countries and industries, and it is likely to vary over
time, depending on the legal and institutional setting, remuneration systems, the views
of employees and employers, etc. Further, the possible existence and level of such a ﬂoor
is clearly an empirical issue.
Some of the mechanisms discussed above, for example the work to rule mechanism,
1Clearly, there exists other mechanisms to provide incentives for eﬀort, like bonus schemes and piece
rates. However, it is an empirical fact that on many work-places, employers do choose a ﬁxed wage
system. This might have several reasons, and in a study of Norwegian knowledge workers, Kuvaas
(2006) ﬁnd that self-reported work performance is positively related to the base pay level, but not to
the bonus level. Furthermore, in an inﬂationary setting, nominal wage increases to workers who provide
high eﬀort might be a simple and useful incentive scheme.
6seem better tested on micro data than more aggregate data. However, we are not aware
of micro studies that do this. One exception is Nickell and Quintini (2003), who, even
if focussing on dnwr at zero, nevertheless report that there are employees “who would
have had a negative nominal wage changes without the distortion who, in fact, have
signiﬁcantly positive, rather than zero, nominal wage changes”. This is exactly what
is predicted by the work to rule story or by the combination of individual dnwr and
eﬃciency wage eﬀects mentioned above.2 However, micro studies would have more dif 
ﬁculty in capturing whether positive wage growth induced by dnwr for some workers
leads to lower wage growth for other workers, possibly oﬀsetting the aggregate eﬀects. In
contrast, such eﬀects might show up in studies on more aggregate data, as in our study.
2 Data and empirical approach
We use an unbalanced panel of industry level data for the annual percentage growth
of gross hourly earnings for manual workers from the manufacturing, mining and quar 
rying, electricity, gas and water supply, and construction sectors of 19 oecd countries
in the period 1973–2006. The countries included in the sample are Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxem 
bourg, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, the uk and the us. The
main data source are wages in manufacturing from ilo and harmonised hourly earnings
from Eurostat. One observation is thus denoted ∆wjit where j is index for industry, i
is index for country and t is index for year. There are all together 13,694 observations
distributed across 604 country year samples, on average 21 industries per country year.
More details on the data are provided in the appendix.
As our observational unit is the change in the average hourly earnings in an industry,
it is aﬀected by both compositional changes in the workforce and by averaging over many
workers. This is crucial for the interpretation of our results, and it will be discussed at
length below.
To explore the existence of a ﬂoor on nominal wage growth, we extend the method
2Several studies have found empirical evidence for the existence of considerable downward real wage
rigidity in a number of oecd countries, mostly based on micro data, see Dickens et al. (2007a), ?, ?,
and ?. However, the nominal ﬂoors we consider in the present paper are generally considerably below
the rate of inﬂation, which is the rigidity explored in these studies.
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Figure 1: Histogram of wage growth in Norway, 1998.
that we have used previously, see Holden and Wulfsberg (2008). The method is a novel
variant of the skewness location approach of McLaughlin (1994), where one constructs
a distribution of “notional” (i.e ﬂexible) wage changes and then detect dnwr in the
empirical wage changes by comparing the empirical and notional distributions of wage
changes. To understand the basic idea, consider the distribution of wage changes within
a given country year sample as in Figure 1 which displays a histogram of the nominal
wage changes in 16 industries in Norway in 1998. The location of the wage change
distributions varies considerably between countries and over time, depending on variables
like inﬂation, productivity growth and unemployment. The dispersion of the distribution
also varies between countries and over time, depending on the size and dispersion of
industry speciﬁc shocks in that country year. If there is a ﬂoor to nominal wage growth,
it would compress the distribution of wage changes from below, implying that there would
be a lack of observations below this ﬂoor, relative to a notional distribution. In Figure
1, it may seem that there should have been some more observations of wage changes
below ﬁve percent, consistent with the idea that dnwr has induced wage changes to be
above this ﬂoor. However, to assess this conclusion formally, we must make more speciﬁc
assumptions about how the country year wage change distribution would have looked if
there had been no downward rigidity, i.e. the notional distribution of wage changes.
In line with previous work on this method (see e.g. Card and Hyslop (1997), Knoppik
and Beissinger, 2003 or Nickell and Quintini, 2003), we construct the notional distribution
on the basis of the empirical wage distribution in high inﬂation years, when dnwr is
8less likely to be binding and aﬀect the observations. More speciﬁcally, the shape or
structural form of the notional distribution is constructed on the basis of a subset of
1,605 observations from the 66 country year samples where both the median nominal and
the median real wage growth are located in their respective upper quartiles. However,
we allow for the median and dispersion (measured by the inter percentile range between
the 75th and the 35th percentiles, following Nickell and Quintini (2003)) to diﬀer across
country year samples.
The formal procedure is outlined in detail in Holden and Wulfsberg (2008), here we
brieﬂy summarize the main steps. First, we construct an underlying distribution of wage
changes where the 1,605 empirical observations from the high inﬂation are normalised
with respect to the country year speciﬁc median (µit) and inter percentile range (P75it−
P35it), i.e.
xs ≡
 
∆wjit − µit
P75it − P35it
 
, s = 1,...,1605 (1)
The left panel of Figure 2 compares the underlying distribution of wage changes with the
standard normal distribution; we notice that the underlying distribution is skewed with
the mean at –2.3 percent.
Second, we compute the country year speciﬁc distribution of notional wage changes
by adjusting the underlying wage change distribution for the country speciﬁc observed
median and inter percentile range
zit
s ≡ xs
 
P75it − P35it
 
+ µit, s = 1,...,1605 (2)
The right panel of Figure 2 compares the empirical distribution (histogram) for Norway
in 1998 with the corresponding notional distribution. Thus, by construction the notional
distribution and the empirical histogram have identical median and inter percentile range,
but the shapes diﬀer, as the notional distribution is based on the shape of the normalised
underlying distribution illustrated to the left in Figure 2. We observe that the country 
speciﬁc notional distribution indicates a considerable probability of wage changes below
5 percent, in contrast to the empirical outcome.
For each ﬂoor φ ∈ {−5,−4.5,−4,... ,10} percent, we estimate the extent of dnwr
by comparing the incidence rate of notional wage changes below the ﬂoor with the corre 
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Figure 2: Left: Histogram of the normalised underlying distribution of wage changes and the
normal density (solid line). Right: Histogram of observed wage changes and the notional wage
change distribution in Norway 1998.
sponding incidence rate of empirical wage changes. For each ﬂoor, φ, the incidence rate
of notional wage cuts is given by
˜ q(φ)it ≡
#zit
s < φ
S
, (3)
and the incidence rate of empirical wage cuts is given by
q(φ)it ≡
#∆wit
s < φ
Sit
, (4)
An often used measure of dnwr is the fraction of wage changes prevented, fwcp(φ),
calculated as fwcp(φ)it = 1 − q(φ)it/q(φ)it. If, for example, the incidence of wage
changes below φ in the empirical sample is half of that in the notional distribution, then
the fwcp = 0.5. Note that if the empirical incidence rate is larger than the notional,
the fwcp is negative.
As there are only on average 21 industries in each country year sample, there may be
considerable stochastic disturbances in µit,P75it − P35it, and qit, which induce consid 
erable disturbances in ˜ qit and fwcpit. Thus, estimates of dnwr in single country years
will be imprecise. However, averages of ˜ qit and fwcpit for groups of country years will
be much more precise. Thus, we will focus on incidence rates and the fwcp at various
aggregation levels: for countries, regions and periods, as well as for the full sample.
We then test if the diﬀerence between the notional and empirical incidence rates is
10statistically signiﬁcant by a simulation method which is as follows. For each country 
year it in the full sample, we draw Sit times (i.e., the number of industries in country 
year it) from a binomial distribution with probability ˜ qit. We then count the number
of simulated wage cuts for the aggregation level of interest, ˆ YM, and compare these
with the total number of wage cuts in the corresponding empirical distribution, YM;
e.g. we compare the simulated number of wage cuts for Portugal with the empirical
one. We then repeat this procedure 5000 times, and count the number of times where
we simulate more notional wage cuts than we observe, denoted #(ˆ YM > YM). The
Null hypothesis is rejected for subsample M with a level of signiﬁcance at 5 percent
if 1 − #(ˆ YM > YM)/5000 ≤ 0.05. We can also use the simulation results to obtain
conﬁdence intervals for our estimate of dnwr.
Before presenting the results, we’ll discuss how they should be interpreted. In prac 
tice, what we look for is compression of the wage change distribution from below, i.e.
that the lower part of the wage change distribution is more aﬀected by dnwr than the
rest of the distribution. As shown by the iwfp, there is a lot of variation in individual
wage growth within each industry. Thus, one would expect all industries to have some
workers whose wage is pushed up by dnwr, implying that also the average wage change
in the industry is aﬀected. However, industries with low average wage growth is likely
to have a larger share of workers whose wage is pushed up by dnwr, and also that their
wage might be pushed up more. This would give rise to a compression of the wage change
distribution from below, as we are looking for.
There are however two important caveats. First, in an industry recovering from a
downturn where dnwr pushed up the wage of many workers, average wage growth might
be lower as fewer workers are aﬀected by dnwr. Thus, higher up in the wage change
distribution, the wage increase may actually be diminished. Another moderating mecha 
nism, analysed by Elsby (2006), is that ﬁrms know that wages are rigid downwards might
be more careful in raising them. Second, which parts of the wage change distribution
that are aﬀected clearly depends on the location of it. In the high inﬂation 1970s and
1980s, only the lower part of the wage change distribution might be aﬀected. Under
lower inﬂation in the 2000s, more industries are likely to be aﬀected by dnwr. This
might actually make it more diﬃcult to detect the compression.
110
.1
.2
.3
.4
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
w
a
g
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
p
r
e
v
e
n
t
e
d
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 3: Fraction of wage changes prevented at diﬀerent ﬂoor levels.
3 Results
We ﬁrst present estimates of the fwcp at diﬀerent levels of a wage ﬂoor for the whole
sample in Figure 3. We have estimated the fwcp and tested its signiﬁcance at every
half percentage point between –5 percent and 10 percent. A signiﬁcant estimate at the
5 percent level is marked by a “×” in the Figure. For the oecd as a whole, we see that
wages are rigid downward at most levels, not only at 0 percent. For example, the fwcp is
around 30–40 percent for wage cuts below 4–5 percent (in absolute value). Hence, wage
rigidity seems to be quite strong for large cuts in the nominal wage. For all wage cuts,
i.e. dnwr at zero percent, the estimate of fwcp is 18 percent. From above 2 percent
downward rigidity does not seem to be strong as the fwcp is less than 4 percent.
In Figure 4 we present estimates of the fwcp at diﬀerent ﬂoor levels for each decade
in the sample. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant dnwr in all decades apart from the 2000s. The curve
has shifted inwards between each decade and eventually become ﬂat in the 2000s. In the
1970s dnwr was binding even at 6–7 percent wage growth, and in the 1980s dnwr was
binding at 3–4 percent.
In Figure 5 we report the results for four regions; Anglo (Canada, Ireland, New
Zealand, the uk and the us), Core (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands), Nordic (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) and South (Italy,
Greece, Portugal and Spain). Note that the regions by and large consist of countries with
rather similar labour market institutions (see discussion in Holden and Wulfsberg, 2008).
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Figure 4: Fraction of wage changes prevented at diﬀerent ﬂoor levels.
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
−4 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Anglo Core
Nordic South
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
w
a
g
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
p
r
e
v
e
n
t
e
d
Figure 5: Fraction of wage changes prevented at diﬀerent ﬂoor levels.
13We ﬁnd more dnwr in the South and Nordic regions than in the Core region. In the
Anglo region we ﬁnd little evidence of dnwr for the period as a whole.
When we look at the estimates for the fwcp for each decade within each region,
however, we ﬁnd evidence of dnwr in the Anglo region in the 1970s with a fwcp of
more than 50 percent at around 4 percent wage growth, see Figure 6. dnwr was also
strong at lower levels (below 2–3 percent wage growth) in these countries during the
1980s. The situation was similar for the Core region (Figure 7) with binding dnwr for
positive wage growth up to 6–7 percent in the 1970s and for wage cuts during the 1980s.
We do not detect any dnwr in the 1990s and 2000s neither in the Anglo nor the Core
region.
For the Nordic region we estimate very a high fwcp in the 1970s and 1980s. We ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant wage ﬂoor in the 1970s around 6 percent wage growth and around 2 percent
in the 1980s. The estimates of the fwcp are lower for the latter two decades than for the
other. The estimates below 1 percent wage growth are signiﬁcant in the 2000s. Wages
in the South region were strongly aﬀected by dnwr in the 1970s and 1980s with binding
rigidity up to 6–8 percent wage growth.
4 Concluding remarks
In recent years, a number of papers have provided extensive evidence for the existence of
considerable downward nominal wage rigidity (dnwr) for job stayers, in many diﬀerent
countries. Typically, the studies indicate that 30 40 percent of all nominal wage cuts
that “should have taken place”, are prevented due to dnwr, with country estimates
ranging from 4–58 percent, see Knoppik and Beissinger (2005) and Dickens et al. (2007a).
However, it is not clear that dnwr for individual workers will lead to a ﬂoor at zero for
nominal wage growth at more aggregate levels. The downward wage rigidity may provide
workers with the possibility of threatening to work less eﬃciently (work to rule), without
the ﬁrm being able to retaliate, thus forcing ﬁrms to grant a nominal wage increase.
Downward wage rigidity may also involve growth in average wages to allow for change
in relative wages. On the other hand, even if nominal wages for job stayers are rigid
downwards, as micro studies indicate, ﬁrms may have nominal ﬂexibility in aggregate as
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Figure 6: Fraction of wage changes prevented at diﬀerent ﬂoor levels.
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Figure 7: Fraction of wage changes prevented at diﬀerent ﬂoor levels.
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Figure 8: Fraction of wage changes prevented at diﬀerent ﬂoor levels.
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Figure 9: Fraction of wage changes prevented at diﬀerent ﬂoor levels.
16turnover involves old, high wage workers being replaced by younger workers with lower
wages. Furthermore, the existence of more ﬂexible types of remuneration, like bonuses
and fringe beneﬁts, may provide ﬁrms with some downward ﬂexibility, even if base wages
are rigid downwards. The existence and level of a ﬂoor on nominal wage is likely to diﬀer
between countries and over time, and it is thus ultimately an empirical question.
We explore the existence of a ﬂoor on nominal wage growth on industry data for 19
oecd countries, for the period 1973–2006. For the 1970s and 80s, we ﬁnd evidence of
a ﬂoor on nominal wage growth in oecd countries at all rates from minus 2 to plus 6
percent. Thus, there were signiﬁcantly less nominal wage changes below these growth
rates than one would have expected if wage setting had been entirely ﬂexible. While
our data with few exceptions does not allow for conclusions about the existence of wage
growth ﬂoors for individual countries, we do have indication of wage growth ﬂoors up
till 4 percent for all the four regions we consider, namely Anglo (native English speaking
countries), Southern European countries, Nordic countries, and Core European countries.
The existence of these ﬂoors clearly reﬂected the persistent high inﬂation rates in these
decades, but the ﬂoors also contributed to high inﬂation being persistent. Note that the
existence of the ﬂoors is not only a matter of persistent high inﬂationary expectations,
as this would aﬀect the location of the wage change distribution, as wage setters would
set high nominal wage increases to reach their target real wages, but not the shape of the
distribution. Thus, high inﬂationary expectations would not compress the lower part of
the wage change distribution, which is the eﬀect we ﬁnd in the 1970s and 80s.
In the 1990s we also ﬁnd evidence of a ﬂoor on nominal wage growth at zero percent,
implying that 17 percent of the industry wage changes that should have been negative,
are pushed above zero by binding dnwr. In the 2000s, however, there is no indication
of a ﬂoor on wage growth at the oecd level, even if there some evidence of signiﬁcant
dnwr for the Nordic countries in the period.
Our ﬁnding of ﬂoors to nominal wage growth in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, but not
in the 2000s, is consistent with our previous work documenting that dnwr has been
much weaker over this periods. Weaker dnwr provides less scope for workers to use
binding dnwr to obtain positive nominal wage growth. However, the disappearance
of these ﬂoors probably also reﬂects changes in wage setting systems making them less
17inﬂationary. More ﬂexible pay systems (references ??) provide workers will less scope for
schemes like work to rule to push up nominal wages. Larger use of performance related
pay also make ﬁrms less inclined and required to use nominal wage increases as a ‘carrot’
to induce high eﬀort from employees. Note, however, that our ﬁnding of no signiﬁcant
dnwr in the 2000s may also reﬂect a weakness with our method in detecting dnwr
in a low inﬂation era. As pointed out above, with low inﬂation many workers in many
industries might be aﬀected by dnwr. This implies that a much large share of the
industry wage change distribution is aﬀected, making it diﬃcult to detect a compression
of the low end.
The observational unit in our data is the change in average hourly earnings for manual
workers within an industry. Thus, our data has the advantage relative to standard
analysis on micro data that it will capture to what extent downward rigidity for some
workers is oﬀset by ﬂexibility in the wage for other workers in the industry. However,
as our data are based on the average of large numbers of workers, and are aﬀected by
compositional changes, it also involves severe limitations as compared to micro data.
Thus, it is our hope that our ﬁndings are followed up in similar studies on micro data.
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A Theoretical framework
To illustrate the main ideas, consider a speciﬁc formalisation (extending Holden (1989)
that captures one of the possible mechanisms that may be at work. There is an industry
consisting of a continuum of ﬁrms with identical production technology, with measure
one. In a fraction of (1−γ) of all ﬁrms, nominal wage rigidity prevails. More speciﬁcally,
we assume that workers are hired at ﬁxed nominal wages which may only be changed
by mutual consent, see MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and Holden (1994). However,
when negotiating a change in the wage contract, workers have the possibility of inﬂicting
a cost on the ﬁrm without violating the employment contract, by strictly adhering to the
rules of the employment contract (work to rule). While the ﬁrm would not be allowed to
reduce regular wages, it might nevertheless impose a cost on workers by reducing bonus
schemes or by other measures. The key assumption is that the payoﬀs of the parties
during negotiations with work to rule depends on the existing nominal contract, deﬂated
by the prevailing price level, subject to additional costs the players may inﬂict upon each
other. Let Π0(W−1/P) and V0(W−1/P) denote the payoﬀs for the ﬁrm and the workers
during work to rule, where W−1 is the existing nominal wage (the same in all ﬁrms),
and P is the aggregate price level. As the parties improve their bargaining position by
inﬂicting a cost on the opponent during the negotiations, it follows that Π0(W−1/P) ≤
Π(W−1/P) and V0(W−1/P) ≤ V (W−1/P), i.e. for given real wages, work to rule is
costly.
The outcome of the wage negotiations is assumed to be given by the Nash bargaining
solution. As shown by Binmore et al. (1986), this can be justiﬁed strategically as the sub 
game perfect equilibrium of a Rubinstein alternating oﬀers bargaining game. However,
the parties also have other opportunities than continuing their bilateral relationship. For
example, the ﬁrm may close down the plant and open a new one with a new workforce,
while the workers may leave the ﬁrm for jobs elsewhere. As shown by Binmore et al.
(1989), these outside options will act as constraint on the bargaining outcome, but they
20will have no eﬀect on the bargaining outcome within the constraint. Speciﬁcally, the work 
ers cannot obtain a wage that is so high that the ﬁrm proﬁts from closing down the plant,
nor can the ﬁrm push the wage so far down that workers obtain higher payoﬀ elsewhere.
Let ωF = W F
P denote the real wage that makes the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between retaining
the existing workforce (at wage ωF) and closing down the plant, while ωW = W W
P is the
real wage that makes workers indiﬀerent between staying with the ﬁrm, and leaving for
alternative jobs. Note that if ωF < ωW, the outcome will be that the parties leave each
other for the outside options, while if ωF ≥ ωW, they will agree on a wage that is either
given by the Nash maximand in the interior of the interval
 
ωW,ωF 
, or it is at one of
the bounds of this interval.
Neglecting for the time being the outside options, the outcome of the wage negotia 
tions is given by (assuming for notational simplicity equal bargaining power)
WN
i =argmax
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The ﬁrst order condition of (5) is
φ
 
Wi
P
,
W−1
P
 
≡
Π′(Wi
P )
Π(Wi
P ) − Π0(
W−1
P )
+
V ′(Wi
P )
V (Wi
P ) − V0(
W−1
P )
= 0 (6)
where the partial derivatives satisfy φ1 < 0 and φ2 > 0. It follows that ∂(Wi/P)/∂W−1 =
−φ2/(Pφ1) > 0. Thus, the real wage outcome is increasing in the old nominal wage, re 
ﬂecting that the old nominal wage aﬀects players’ disagreement points. Whether nominal
wages increase or not depends on which party is hurt the most by work to rule. Mea 
suring utility in wage units, work to rule is more costly to the ﬁrm than to the workers
if
Π(Wi
P ) − Π0(
W−1
P )
−Π′(Wi
P )
>
V (Wi
P ) − V0(
W−1
P )
V ′(Wi
P )
(7)
If (7) holds, we observe that φ > 0 for Wi = W−1, which implies that the solution to
(6) is a wage WN
i > W−1, i.e. nominal wage increase. In most employment relationships,
one would expect a work to rule to be more costly to the ﬁrm than to the workers. The
workers will usually have a variety of ways they can reduce proﬁts for the ﬁrm, and
they will beneﬁt from choosing the one that inﬂicts the largest possible costs on the
ﬁrm, cf Moene (1988) and Holden (1989). The upshot will be an increase in nominal
wages. However, with more ﬂexible pay systems, ﬁrms have larger scope for reducing
remuneration during a work to rule, and the resulting nominal wage change will be lower
and possibly negative.
If bargaining with work to rule leads to WN
i /P > ωF, i.e. lower proﬁts than the ﬁrm
can obtain elsewhere (the outside option), the real wage outcome will be equal to ωF.
In this case a marginal change in W−1 would not aﬀect the real wage outcome, even if a
larger reduction in W−1 might lead WN
i /P to fall below ωF, thus reducing the real wage
outcome. Note that better outside opportunities for ﬁrms give less scope for nominal
wage growth induced by dnwr.
A special case is illuminating (again neglecting outside options, as the eﬀect of in 
cluding them are as just described). We assume that workers are only concerned about
wages, and that work to rule involves no direct costs or beneﬁts to the workers (no bonus
21schemes and no cost of eﬀort), implying that V (Wi
P ) = Wi
P and V0(
W−1
P ) =
W−1
P . During
a work to rule, revenues R are a fraction θ ∈ (0,1) of their normal values, implying that
Π(Wi
P ) = R − Wi
P Li, Π′(Wi
P ) = −Li and Π0(
W−1
P ) = θRi −
W−1
P Li. Substituting out in
the ﬁrst order condition (6), we derive the resulting wage level, which is identical for all
ﬁrms with rigid wages
WR =
1 − θ
2
R
L
+ W−1
or, re arranging to obtain an equation for the growth in nominal wages,
∆wR ≡
WR − W−1
W−1
=
1 − θ
2
R
LW−1
Thus, we see that the growth in nominal wages is strictly positive, and proportionate to
the costs of the ﬁrm during a work to rule.
In the remaining fraction γ of the ﬁrms, wages are ﬂexible, and assumed to be given
by a standard wage setting relation, where the real wage in ﬁrm i, Wi
P is a function
of unemployment among workers in the industry, u, and the average real wage in the
industry, W
P ,
Wi
P
= W
 
u,
W
P
 
. (8)
The partial derivatives satisfy W1 < 0, W2 > 0, reﬂecting that both in an eﬃciency wage
model or in a bargaining framework, the real wage is increasing in the value of the outside
opportunities, which clearly depend negatively on the unemployment rate and positively
on the alternative wage (see e.g. Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) and Blanchﬂower
and Oswald (1995) for surveys of empirical evidence in favour of the existence of a wage
curve).
Industry unemployment is given as the diﬀerence between the exogenous labour sup 
ply l, and labour demand, which is a function of the real wage in the ﬁrms with ﬂexible
and rigid wages, l(
WF
P ) and l(
WR
P )
u = l − γl
 
WF
P
 
− (1 − γ)l
 
WR
P
 
. (9)
Labour demand is decreasing in the real wage, so that l′ < 0. Exogenous labour supply to
the industry is adopted to simplify the exposition, but the qualitative results would hold
also under weaker assumptions. The key assumption is that there are industry speciﬁc
skills and various frictions which imply that a reduction in industry employment will lead
to higher unemployment among workers previously employed in the industry.
Then consider the eﬀect on the industry variables of nominal wage growth in the
ﬁrms with rigid wages, ∆wR > 0. A ﬁrst order Taylor approximation of (8) and (9) gives
us
∆wF = W1∆u +
W2
P
(γ∆wF + (1 − γ)∆wR) (10)
∆u = −γl′∆wF − (1 − γ)l′∆wR (11)
which solve for (assuming for simplicity that wages in the previous year were identical in
22all ﬁrms)
∆wF =
−W1
l′
P + W2
P
1 + γW1
l′
P − γ W2
P
(1 − γ)∆wR ≷ 0 (12)
∆w = (γ∆wF + (1 − γ)∆wR) =


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−W1
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P
+ 1

(1 − γ)∆wR > 0 (13)
∆u = −l′(.)


γ
 
−W1
l′
P + W2
P
 
1 + γW1
l′
P − γ W2
P
+ 1

(1 − γ)∆wR > 0. (14)
Nominal wage growth induced by dnwr in some ﬁrms unambiguously leads to higher
unemployment and higher industry wages. However, the eﬀect on the wage in ﬁrms with
ﬂexible wage setting is ambiguous. Higher outside wages has a positive direct eﬀect on
wages in the ﬂexible ﬁrms, but the indirect eﬀect via higher unemployment is negative,
so the overall eﬀect is uncertain. If the remainder of the industry labour market is
essentially competitive, which in our model would correspond to the limit case when
W1 converges to minus inﬁnity, the eﬀect of wage growth induced by dnwr in some
ﬁrms is fully absorbed by wage ﬂexibility in other ﬁrms so that ∆ω and ∆u converge
to zero. In contrast, if unemployment has little impact on the wage setting, i.e. W1
small numerically, then wage growth induced by dnwr in some ﬁrms will lead to higher
wages also in the ﬁrms with ﬂexible wages, amplifying the negative eﬀect on the rate of
unemployment.
To summarise, the eﬀect on unemployment and wage growth of dnwr in a part of the
industry depends on the how large part of the industry is aﬀected, and the eﬀect in this
part, but it also depends on the response of wages in other parts of the industry. Flexible
pay systems and good outside opportunities for ﬁrms reduce workers and unions scop
for pushing up nominal wages. If wages fall in the remainder of the industry, the impact
on unemployment will be dampened, and in the limit oﬀset completely. In contrast, if
wages in the remainder of the industry are also pushed up, the industry eﬀect will be
magniﬁed.
23